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INTRODUCTION 
“A house divided against itself cannot stand.” – Abraham Lincoln.1 
It is an oft-quoted saying: A singular entity with warring among its unified members will 
fail to prosper. Jesus offered this wisdom during his ministry,2 and, nearly 1900 years later, soon-
to-be President Lincoln echoed the same understanding as the United States stood on the brink of 
civil war.3 In the 1860s, the nation’s response to this proverb was waging war to hold together 
the singular house. In the future, however, the nation’s response may very well be to construct a 
second house.4 If there again comes such a dire circumstance that it forces a choice between the 
two solutions, the latter should be threshed out thoroughly and given a serious look. The Civil 
War took 618,000 lives—more than every other American war through the Korean War 
combined—and claimed 2% of the entire U.S. population.5 
Though the U.S. may not be as close to a brother-against-brother entanglement as it was 
in 1858, neither may it be as far from one as many would like to think.6 After the most recent 
presidential election, which witnessed “a divided nation vote[] to give [Barack Obama] more 
time,” the unified collection of states is quite clearly on shaky ground.7 It is a “deeply divided 
country”8 in which, following the 2012 election results, residents in each of the 50 states filed 
petitions to secede from the Union.9 “More than 675,000 digital signatures appeared on 69 
                                                
1 Abraham Lincoln, Address at the Republican State Convention in Springfield, Ill. (June 16, 1858). 
2 Matthew 12:25. 
3 Lincoln, supra note 1. 
4 David Caller, WH 'Secede' Petitions Reach 675,000 Signatures, 50-State Participation, 
DAILYCALLER.COM (Nov. 14, 2012, 2:01 AM), http://nation.foxnews.com/2012-presidential-
election/2012/11/14/wh-secede-petitions-reach-675000-signatures-50-state-participation#ixzz2OZsQ2ELq. 
5 Craig Lambert, The Deadliest War, HARVARDMAGAZINE.COM, May-June 2001, 
http://harvardmagazine.com/2001/05/the-deadliest-war-html. 
6 Id. 
7 Jeff Zeleny & Jim Rutenberg, Divided U.S. Gives Obama More Time, NY TIMES (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/us/politics/obama-romney-presidential-election-
2012.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
8 Id. 
9 Caller, supra note 4. 
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separate secession petitions covering all 50 states” in less than seven days following the 
election.10 Seven of the states’ petitions—including those from Florida and Texas—received 
more than the 25,000 signatures required to illicit an official response from the White House.11 
The basic sentiment within those petitions was that the federal government is abusing its power 
and violating citizens’ rights.12 Combine those beliefs with certain beliefs of state leaders, such 
as those of Wyoming State Representative Alan Jaggi, claiming that the federal government is 
also infringing upon state sovereignty, and the secession pot begins to boil.13 
That the pot is boiling is one thing; whether that pot has the potential to boil over is quite 
another. Unlike other recent scholarly articles on the topic,14 this Note is neither limited to solely 
analyzing the Constitutional arguments surrounding secession nor armed to thoroughly untangle 
the intricate web of practical hypotheticals that may arise with secession. Instead it focuses on 
several of the most compelling arguments surrounding secession in arriving at the concept’s 
                                                
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 The sentiment reflected in these petitions is proffered well by Micah H. of Arlington, Texas, in the 
petition he filed:  
The U.S. continues to suffer economic difficulties stemming form the federal government’s 
neglect to reform domestic and foreign spending . . . [and] to [withdraw from the union] would 
protect [Texas’] citizens standard of living and re-secure their rights and liberties in accordance 
with the original ideas and beliefs of our founding fathers which are no longer being reflected by 
the federal government. 
Residents in More Than 30 States File Secession Petitions, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Nov. 13, 2012, 7:44 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/13/petition-to-secede-states_n_2120410.html. 
13 Jeremy Pelzer, This Does Draw a Line in the Sand, TRIB.COM (Mar. 12, 2010, 12:00 AM), 
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/this-does-draw-a-line-in-the-sand/article_06b41f54-b4cb-
566b-8ac2-c61ecf272d04.html. Jaggi, in referring to recent firearm legislation passed in Wyoming, stated, “This 
does draw a line in the sand in saying our state sovereignty means something – please let us have it.” Id. 
14 See e.g. Andrei Kreptul, The Constitutional Right of Secession in Political Theory and History, 17 J. OF 
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 39 (2003), available at http://mises.org/journals/jls/17_4/17_4_3.pdf (focusing on only the 
constitutionality of secession); see also Stephen Neff, Secession and Breach of Compact: The Law of Nature Meets 
the United States Constitution, 45 AKRON L. REV. 405 (2012) (focusing on constitutional ratification and 
understanding throughout the history of the United States in discussing secession’s legitimacy); see also Thomas 
Ulen, Secession: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, U. OF ILL. INST. OF GOVT. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 7-12 (1997) (delving into intricacies of optimal secession regarding economics). 
 5 
legitimacy necessitating its allowance as a last resort.15 Even if one might disagree with the 
legitimacy of withdrawal, secession ought to be codified if not for any other reason but that the 
alternative for a successful departure from the Union by a determined populace is violence—see: 
the Civil War. Therefore, a procedure is set forth below to allow for controlled secession while 
resulting in a peaceable withdrawal and protecting the concerns of both parties. 
Part I highlights the mounting political and regional polarization taking place within the 
United States and looks at both current and past actions of states refusing federal domination. 
Part II explains the legal legitimacy of secession from the Union in light of the historical and 
Constitutional framework under which the nation was formed. Part III then puts forth the most 
convincing arguments that oppose secession while Part IV responds to those arguments. Finally 
Part V, while acknowledging very real concerns, concludes that secession has a very real claim 
of legitimacy behind it and ought be used as an absolute last resort. It also offers, assembled 
from both American and international influences, a fittingly legitimate provision that allows any 
secession be done in the most amicable and least damaging way possible. 
I. STATES’ SWELLING REFUSAL OF FEDERAL DOMINATION AMIDST NATIONAL POLARIZATION 
 
 This entire topic of secession is, granted, a bit farfetched as of this moment in 2013 in the 
U.S. Or is it? If it is, will it be so in 2020? In 2030? Based on growing partisan division marked 
by individuals entrenching and surrounding themselves with like-minded Americans16 and the 
recent swell in state legislation defying federal regulation,17 the answer is no. As both prominent 
                                                
15 See infra Section II (highlighting constitutional, moral, and practical reasons to recognize secession’s 
legitimacy under certain circumstances). 
16 Gerald F. Seib, Election Sharpens the Partisan Divide, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2012, 3:45 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324339204578171180887571110.html. 
17 See infra Section I.B (listing and explaining recent state legislative efforts to retain state sovereignty in 
various areas). 
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periodicals and the most recent presidential election results make clear, the U.S. is deeply 
divided both politically and geographically.18 
A. The Divided States of America 
 After the November 2012 election, electoral maps everywhere revealed the same 
landscape: “Republican areas appeared to be growing darker red, while Democratic regions 
seemed to be growing darker blue.”19  The Wall Street Journal referred to the information 
gathered from that election as “leading indicators of polarization.”20 In addition to the hundreds 
of thousands of citizens who signed secession petitions immediately following the election,21 
statistics from that first Tuesday in November were equally as jarring.22 Only fifteen Republicans 
elected to the House came from districts that Barack Obama carried, and only nine elected House 
Democrats came from district carried by Republican Mitt Romney.23 And these representatives 
not only won, but won in “landslides”—with 125 elected House members garnering 70% or 
more of the district’s vote.24 
 It would be easy to dismiss this as dispersed political quarreling sprinkled around the 
nation among those diminutive political subunits known as districts—but not once other statistics 
are revealed. The division is national: between partisan states and partisan areas of the country.25 
“The number of states that are so clearly red or so clearly blue that they aren't seriously contested 
                                                
18 See Seib, supra note 16 (explaining the way in which 2012 election results portray growing division 
between parties and between regions within the U.S.). 
19 Seib, supra note 16. 
20 Id. 
21 See Caller, supra note 4 (reporting that secession petition signatures numbered well above 600,000 
within one week of the election). 
22 See Seib, supra note 16. “Of the 234 Republicans elected to the House, just 15 come from districts that 
the Democratic president carried, according to a running tally compiled by David Wasserman of the Cook Political 
Report. Of 201 Democrats elected, just nine come from districts Republican Mitt Romney carried.” Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Sue Sturgis, Institute Index: The Deepening Partisan Divide in U.S. Politics, SOUTHERNSTUDIES.ORG 
(Nov. 30, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.southernstudies.org/2012/11/institute-index-the-deepening-partisan-divide-
in-us-politics.html (pointing out partisan domination state-by-state and lack of regional, partisan turnover in the 
2012 election). 
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in presidential races is climbing, while the number of swing states in the middle is falling.”26 In 
1960, twenty states “were decided by margins of less than 5%;” in 2012, “the number was 
four.”27 Because states “remain[] firmly entrenched in one column or the other,” the race for the 
presidency simply passes by most of the nation’s voters.28 The landscape that emerges is one in 
which “Democrats talk[] to Democrats and Republicans to Republicans, but fewer people try[] to 
talk to one another across that partisan divide.”29  
 Backing up this sentiment are the facts: After the 2012 election, only three of the fifty 
state legislatures have different parties controlling the two chambers—meaning forty-seven 
states are either “under single-party control or have a unicameral legislature.”30 As for where 
these partisan states are located, an analysis of the recent electoral maps is quite indicative of a 
regional schism.31  The pervasive idea that the Republican Party is tied to the South is accurate. 
As one study reports, “Commentators have argued that the Republican Party is increasingly 
keyed to the American South, and in particular to the old Confederacy. The map 
analysis…indicates a tendency in this direction.”32 The map also shows “Democratic support in 
the interior portion of the Upper South continu[ing] to plummet, with most of the region’s few 
remaining blue counties turning red.”33  
                                                
26 Seib, supra note 16. 
27 Id. Seib notes that 
In this year's contest, there really were only nine true swing states that were seriously contested. 
By contrast, as National Journal has noted, in the 1960 presidential election, 20 states were so 
closely contested that they were decided by margins of less than 5%. By 2000, the number of 
similarly competitive states had dropped to 12. This year, the number was four. 
Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. (adding that in the nation’s capital, “the political middle is barren the partisan divide remains stark”). 
30 Sturgis, supra note 25. 
31 Martin W. Lewis, Changes in U.S. Electoral Geography from 2000 to 2012: A Renewed North/South 
Divide?, GEOCURRENTS, http://geocurrents.info/geopolitics/elections/changes-in-u-s-electoral-geography-from-
2000-to-2012-a-renewed-northsouth-divide#ixzz2PbrJJpNC. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. (reporting that “At the national level, one sees a slight intensification of macro-regional patterns, with 
the South trending a bit more Republican and the North trending a bit more Democratic”). 
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B. Recent State Legislative Efforts to Retain State Sovereignty 
 With the partisan gatherings growing both state-by-state and in identifiable regions,34 it is 
no surprise that there has been a recent and growing trend among various state legislatures 
discontent with the action of the federal government to reassert their sovereignty in certain 
areas.35 While there are countless examples of this phenomenon, such as the state-by-state 
legalization of medical marijuana and the refusal by dozens of states to implement federal 
standards regarding state IDs, 36 a few are worth examining in depth: treatment of the Affordable 
Care Act (a.k.a. Obamacare), reaction to federal gun control actions, and states’ consideration 
and passage of general sovereignty measures.37 
 1. States’ Refusal of Federal Health Insurance Control 
 At least twenty-six, more than half, of the fifty states allowed the federally mandated 
mid-February 2013 deadline for a state health-insurance-exchange-plan slip right by without 
lifting a finger.38 Actually, only seventeen states and Washington D.C. filed their plans because 
seven others intend to build exchanges in cohesion with the federal government.39 While a 
portion of these twenty-six states not filing plans may simply be opting for federal intervention, a 
                                                
34 See supra Section I.A (highlighting the trend toward partisan division within the U.S. in recent years and, 
more specifically, months). 
35 See J.D. Tuccille, State Secession Petitions: Ticked-off Americans Want Out, REASON.COM (Nov. 12, 
2012, 11:45 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2012/11/12/state-secession-petitions-give-us-libert (pointing out many 
American’s displeasure with the actions and growth of the federal government and pointing to state legislation as a 
result of that displeasure). 
36 See Suzanne Weiss, Sovereignty Measures and Other Steps May Indicate an Upsurge in Anti-federal 
Sentiment in Legislatures, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislatures/facing-off-with-the-feds.aspx (listing and explaining the 
several main manifestations of state frustration with recent federal governance). 
37 See infra Subsections I.B.1, I.B.2, I.B.3 (highlighting and analyzing these sovereignty reactions by state 
legislatures). 
38 Sahil Kapur, GOP States Invite Washington to Run Their Healthcare, TALKINGPOINTSMEMO.COM (Feb. 
19, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/02/which-states-are-building-obamacare-
exchanges.php. 
39 Id. 
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good number of them are abstaining as a matter of principle.40 That principle is states’ rights, and 
it is trumpeted by the fact that, after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, states did not stop at 
merely ignoring the aforementioned deadline. So as to protect its citizens’ religious liberty, 
Virginia recently passed an amendment that “prohibits health insurance plans that are part of 
federal health insurance exchanges required by Obamacare from covering abortion services 
except in cases of rape, incest and life of the mother.”41 Furthermore, thirteen states introduced 
bills to nullify Obamacare in the months following the Act’s passage.42 And at least a fourteenth, 
South Carolina, has since joined the fray and may be close to passing its bill.43 In late March 
2013, the Constitutional Law Subcommittee of the state’s House passed the Freedom of 
Healthcare Protection Act aimed at “Render[ing] Null And Void Certain Unconstitutional Laws 
Enacted By The Congress Of The United States Taking Control Over The Health Insurance 
Industry.”44 
 2. States’ Refusal of Expansive Federal Gun Control 
 Healthcare is not the only arena in which state and federal leaders are facing off. Eight 
states have already passed the Firearm Freedom Act, and the Act has been proposed in twenty-
                                                
40 John Davidson, States’ Refusal To Establish Exchanges Could Undo Obamacare, THE DAILY CALLER 
(Jan. 17, 2013, 3:11 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/01/17/states-refusal-to-establish-exchanges-could-undo-
obamacare/ (indicating that a good number of states are refusing to set up exchanges so as to stand their ground 
against the federal control of health care and protect their citizens from federal taxes and penalties in the long run). 
41 Miraculous Success: Life and Conscience Protected, FAMILYFOUNDATION.ORG (April 4, 2013), 
http://familyfoundation.org/2013/04/miraculous-success-life-and-conscience-protected/. 
42 Matthew Spalding, Rejecting Nullification: Idaho Draws the Constitutional Line, HERITAGE.ORG (Mar. 
2, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2011/03/02/rejecting-nullification-idaho-draws-the-constitutional-line/. 
43 Joe Wolverton, South Carolina One Step Closer to Nullifying Obamacare, THE NEW AMERICAN (April 1, 
2013, 4:29 PM), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/14966-south-carolina-one-step-closer-
to-nullifying-obamacare.  
44 Id. The bill’s purpose, as stated in its preamble, is to 
Render Null And Void Certain Unconstitutional Laws Enacted By The Congress Of The United 
States Taking Control Over The Health Insurance Industry And Mandating That Individuals 
Purchase Health Insurance Under Threat Of Penalty; To Prohibit Certain Individuals From 
Enforcing Or Attempting To Enforce Such Unconstitutional Laws; And To Establish Criminal 
Penalties And Civil Liability For Violating This Article. 
Id. 
 10 
five others.45 The Act is “cleverly designed to challenge expansive federal claims of regulatory 
authority under the Commerce Clause.”46 Seen by many as “draw[ing] a line in the sand in 
saying [a] state[‘s] sovereignty means something,” the law bases its legitimacy on the argument 
that “since the federal government justifies its ability to regulate firearms on a section of the U.S. 
Constitution allowing Congress to regulate interstate commerce, any guns that never leave a state 
are exempt from federal control.”  
Thus Wyoming, for example, a state having passed the Firearms Freedom Act, now 
provides within its statutory code that a “personal firearm, a firearm action or receiver, a firearm 
accessory, or ammunition that is manufactured commercially or privately in the state to be used 
or sold within the state is not subject to federal law or federal regulation, including registration, 
under the authority of congress to regulate interstate commerce.”47 Provisions such as these place 
state government squarely at odds with the federal government in that they “not only reject 
federal power over the intrastate regulation of firearms, [they] also place[] [a state] as a shield 
between the federal government and [a state’s] citizens who comply with the Act but violate 
countervailing federal law.”48  
 3. States’ Refusal to Surrender Sovereignty 
 All of these individual confrontations mentioned above, such as healthcare, federal ID 
regulations for states, and an expanding Commerce Clause, have one common characteristic—
                                                
45 State by State, FIREARMSFREEDOMACT.COM (Mar. 17, 2013), http://firearmsfreedomact.com/state-by-
state/ (displaying a color-coded map of the act’s status in each state). 
46 Spalding, supra note 42. 
47 WY. STAT. 1977 § 6-8-404 (2011). 
48 O. Shane Balloun, The Disarming Nature of the Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act: A Constitutional 
Analysis of Wyoming’s Interposition between its Citizens and the Federal Government, 11 WYO. L. REV. 201, 201 
(2011).  
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inflating the size and influence of the federal government.49 And because, from the pool of 
governmental powers generally, both the powers under the federal government’s supremacy and 
the powers presumably “reserved” to the states or the people by the Tenth Amendment cannot 
simultaneously grow in number, the federal government’s expansion necessarily means that 
those powers “reserved” to the states by the Tenth Amendment must dwindle.50 Add this 
reduction in sovereignty to the list of matters states have begun to address head-on. 
Five states have passed and signed into law something known as “state sovereignty” 
resolutions—also referred to as a “Tenth Amendment resolutions”—since 2009.51 Another ten 
states passed such a resolution in both legislative houses since that time.52 Eleven others saw the 
sovereignty resolutions pass in one of the state’s law making bodies.53 The resolutions, similar to 
Thomas Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolution and James Madison’s Virginia Resolution declaring a 
state’s right to disregard unconstitutional acts of Congress,54 were drafted as “formal protests 
against federal encroachment on states’ authority and prerogatives under the 10th Amendment.”55 
“The wording and tone of sovereignty resolutions vary, but typically they begin by asserting 
states’ authority and prerogatives under the 10th Amendment and go on to denounce and call for 
an end to the federal government’s usurpation of states’ constitutionally delegated powers.”56 
                                                
49 See supra Subsections IV.B.1, IV.B.2 (listing several legislated areas in what the state and federal 
governments are going head-to-head and explaining healthcare and the Commerce Clause’s influence on gun rights 
in depth). 
50 U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”). 
51 Tenth Amendment Resolutions, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (2013), 
http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/nullification/10th-amendment-resolutions/ (showing a map of resolutions 
proposed, passed by one house, passed by both houses, and signed into law by state governors). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 James Madison,Virginia Resolutions, Dec. 24, 1798, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 182 (Henry 
Steele Commager ed., 9th ed. 1975); Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, CONSTITUTION.ORG, 
http://www.constitution.org/cons/kent1798.htm (last vistied May 5, 2013) (stating “that whensoever the general 
government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force”). 
55 Weiss, supra note 36. 
56 Id. Weiss reports that  
 12 
The state’s ability to protect fundamental liberties from federal encroachment is also a focus.57  
These measures are “non-binding” and do not carry the force of law;58 they instead, 
following the Court’s decision in New York v. United States, serve as “notice” by each resolving 
state to the federal government that the state will choose which federal mandates it chooses to 
accept and which mandates it claims exemption to under the Tenth Amendment.59 While a state 
obviously need not have passed a resolution to refuse to follow an unconstitutional mandate, the 
passage of these resolutions, as mentioned above, is more about protest and the serving of notice 
to the federal government that states are aware of decreasing sovereignty—a trend they will fight 
to withstand.60 Working under the presumption that the Constitution is, in fact, a compact 
between states and the federal government, consider this a claim for “breach.”61 
II. SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY IN ALLOWING SECESSION AS A LAST RESORT 
                                                                                                                                                       
Oklahoma’s resolution, for example, declares that ‘many federal laws are in direct violation of the 
10th Amendment,’ effectively ‘commandeering the legislative and regulatory processes of the 
states.’ It demands prohibition or repeal of mandates that come without adequate federal funding 
and/or require states to comply under threat of penalties or sanctions. 
Id. 
57 S. Res. 632 (Ga. 2009) (passed), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-
US/display/20092010/SR/632. On April 1, 2009, the Georgia State Senate passed the resolution 43-1. It asserted the 
right of states to nullify federal laws under some circumstances. The resolution also asserted that if Congress, the 
president, or the federal judiciary took certain steps, such as establishing martial law without state consent, requiring 
some types of involuntary servitude, taking any action regarding religion or restricting freedom of political speech, 
or establishing further prohibitions of types or quantities of firearms or ammunition, the Constitution establishing 
the United States government would be considered nullified and the Union would be dissolved. Id. 
58 See TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER, supra, note 51. 
If you owned an apartment building and had a tenant not paying rent, you wouldn’t show up with 
an empty truck to kick them out without first serving notice. That’s how we view these 
Resolutions – as serving “notice and demand” to the Federal Government to “cease and desist 
any and all activities outside the scope of their constitutionally-delegated powers.” Follow-up, 
of course, is a must. 
Id. 
59 Charles Duke, Implementing the Tenth Amendment: State Sovereignty Resolution, SWEETLIBERTY.ORG, 
http://www.sweetliberty.org/tenthamend.htm (citing to New York v. United States,112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). “The 
federal government was attempting to mandate that the State of New York accept radioactive waste for disposal.” Id. 
But “New York pleaded they were exempt from the mandate under the Tenth Amendment and the court affirmed the 
Tenth Amendment protection. Thus, by having proclaimed sovereignty, a state is in the position to select those 
mandates they will follow, now by choice, not by edict.” Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See infra Section II.A (arguing that the Constitution is a compact between and among the states and that 
a breach by the federal government, also a party to the contract, of the provisions of that compact entitles the states, 
individually as parties, to rescind the contract and return to an individual, sovereign state—as before the Union). 
 13 
 
While secession may sound radical and extreme to many Americans,62 this has not 
always been the case.63 “The case for state sovereignty and the constitutional right of secession 
had flourished for forty years before a comparable case for perpetual union had been devised.”64 
Not only does the nation’s history show support for the legitimacy of secession, but the structure 
of American government as evidenced by the Constitution and compelling moral arguments also 
bolster the idea that secession may not only be acceptable, but preferable under certain 
circumstances.65 Ultimately, when weighing the pro’s and con’s of secession, avoiding a war of 
the magnitude seen on U.S. soil in the 1860’s is a heavy factor. 
A. Support for Permitting Secession in Light of the Union’s Historical Development 
 The constitutional crisis of secession hinged on the balance of sovereignty in the political 
framework that the U.S. Constitution of 1787 had formed.66 The crucial question, specifically, 
was whether the Constitution created “a union of sovereign states, each of which retained the 
right to secede at its own discretion?” or whether it created “a union from which no state, once 
having joined, could escape except by an extra-constitutional act of revolution?”67 In looking at 
both the ratification of the Constitution and the overriding breach-of-compact argument, in 
which the process that formed the Union plays a significant role, one can justify the conclusion 
that history stands behind permitting secession.  
 1. Constitutional Ratification as Support for States’ Sovereignty 
It may not be surprising that a leading nineteenth-century nullification advocate, Vice 
President John C. Calhoun from South Carolina, supported the former assertion above—that the 
                                                
62 See Caller, supra note 4 (indicating that some citizens called for those who signed the secession petitions 
to be relieved of their U.S. citizenship). 
63 Kenneth Stampp, The Concept of a Perpetual Union, 65 J. AM. HIST. 5, 33 (1978). 
64 Id.  
65 See infra Section II.A (explaining the various justifications for allowing secession in some form). 
66 Stampp, supra note 63, at 5. 
67 Id. 
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federal government is “the government of a community of States, and not the government of a 
single State or nation.”68 However, it might resonate more with the average American citizen that 
a prominent founding father, James Madison, agreed. He wrote in the compelling Federalist 
Papers that creation of the Union was “the act of the people, as forming so many independent 
States, not as forming one aggregate nation.”69 Referenced above, Madison’s Virginia Resolution 
of 1798 furthers this idea by making clear that the powers of the national government “result[ed] 
from [a] compact.”70 In support of this concept of the Constitution as a voluntarily agreed-upon 
compact among the states is the fact that the American people formed the Union through the 
media of the different sovereign states into which they were divided at that time, not by giving 
approval as a unified population of individual persons.71 
Assuming these states were indeed sovereign prior to the unification brought about by the 
Constitution, then they, as pre-existing political entities, maintained their character as sovereign 
states even after creating the Union.72 The result of that creation was that they were tied together 
as separate but committed political communities in a continuing, ongoing contractual 
relationship.73 Additionally, as Madison pointed out, the “compact” nature of the Union is seen 
in the fact that each state entered into it on a purely voluntary basis—as opposed to a “majority 
will” binding the minority, as would be the case in a singular, political society.74 
Still, presuming acceptance of the Constitution as a compact among sovereign states, one 
is left pondering: Does that mean it is inherently terminable at will by any party to the 
                                                
68  See Neff, supra note 14, at 413, citing to John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and 
Government of the United States, in JOHN C. CALHOUN, UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPH OF JOHN 
C. CALHOUN 79 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992). 
69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
70 Virginia Resolutions, supra note 54. 
71 Neff, supra note 14, at 413.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 414. 
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agreement? Because one can agree that the Constitution is a compact but still believe that the 
Union is perpetual in nature and not terminable for any reason.75  
2. Rescission (Secession) As Lawful Remedy for Breach of Compact 
Merriam Webster defines “rescind[ing]” as “abrogat[ing] (a contract) and restor[ing] the 
parties to the positions they would have occupied had there been no contract.”76 In the remedial 
context, “[o]ne party to a contract can rescind it because of substantial nonperformance or breach 
by the other party.77 However, not just any breach gives rise to rescission; the breach must be “so 
substantial and fundamental that it defeats the objective of the parties in making the agreement.” 
In fact, Webster’s example provided under “rescission” reads, “the judge ruled that the town's 
rescission of the contract was justified due the contractor's repeated failures to meet its 
obligations.”78  
Rescission comes into play within the secession discussion under the assumption that 
while the Union is “perpetual,” it is only so in the “weak” sense of the word as opposed to the 
strong interpretation, which would completely bar dissolution regardless of circumstances.79 This 
weak definition is the more common sense of the two, given the unpredictability of 
circumstances generally,80 and is the one with which the Civil War era secessionists equipped 
themselves.81 It means “that the Union was perpetual in principle, or that it was intended at the 
outset to be perpetual—but that this aspiration of perpetuity could only be achieved in reality by 
                                                
75 Id. at 415. 
76 MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rescission (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
77 Legal Dictionary, FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Rescission+of+contract (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
78 MERRIAM WEBSTER, supra note 76 (last emphasis added). 
79 Neff, supra note 14, at 416.  
80 See generally Section II.C (discussing circumstances such as revolution, moral crises, and imminent war 
as extreme circumstances calling for dissolution regardless of documentary provisions). 
81 Neff, supra note 14, at 416.  
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the continued adherence of the parties to the original arrangements over time.”82 The Supreme 
Court grappled with this idea in the Reconstruction case of Texas v. White.83 The Court seemed 
to reluctantly arrive at a conclusion of weak perpetuity as well in acknowledging that, at least 
“through [the circumstance of] revolution, or through consent of the States,” a state may revoke 
its status within the Union.84 The Confederacy reinforced its grasp of perpetuity in its own 
constitution that, like the U.S. binding document, neglected a prohibition of secession but stated 
it was intended to form a “permanent federal government”—also presumably in the weak 
sense.85 
Working with the understanding, then, that the Constitution and the Union were created 
as a collective compact among sovereign states and that rescission would be an appropriate 
contractual remedy in the case of one party’s substantial breach, one must next discern when and 
by what authority a party may declare cause for rescission.  
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political 
bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the 
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent 
respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them 
to the separation.86 
 
The Declaration directly answers what one can devote pages upon pages to sorting out. The 
simple answer is “natural law.”87 The right to rescission of a contract between two sovereigns 
rests in adherence to natural law—a power outside and above either of the two parties—that 
                                                
82 Id. 
83 74 U.S. 700, 725-26 (1868). The Court split the difference on this issue in a way: It asked, “What can be 
indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect [under the Constitution], is not?” Id. at 725. At the same time, 
the Court proceeded to quote the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the states or the American people 
generally and noted that “the people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with 
all the functions essential to separate and independent existence.” Id. 
84  Id. at 726. 
85 Neff, supra note 14, at 416 (emphasis added). 
86 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
87 Neff, supra note 14, at 415-22 (discussing in depth natural law and the understanding of natural law 
within the U.S. during the nineteenth century as the authority by which a state could rescind the contract between it 
and the federal government known as the Constitution). 
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requires the fulfillment of contractual obligations.88 It was natural law that was the authoritative 
glue binding state to state, not the commands of a sovereign, central government.89 Therefore, in 
that same vein, it was and is natural law that points to rescission as the proper remedy in the 
event that there be a violation of the agreement.90 Early Americans were clearly familiar with 
this reasoning as evidenced by the Declaration of Independence, and that reasoning is not of the 
sort that expires with time: Unlike the role and balance of governments, God and Nature do not 
vary with the ebbs and flows of society. That remarkable founding document is filled with 
reference to natural law and the concept of a right of rescission is derived from violation of such 
law. 
 
B. Constitutional Grounds for Entertaining the Possibility of Secession 
 In addition to historical evidence for the permissibility of secession under extreme 
conditions, the very system of government employed by the United States screams for secession 
as a last resort. Tenth Amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”91 The fact that “powers” are “reserved” for the states indicates that, at some level and at 
some point, the federal government must stop short of acquiring all powers of governance.92 But 
if it does not, what is the consequence? Where is a state’s “out”?  
One argument is that the only answer, ultimately, is withdrawal from the Union. Though 
the danger of that ongoing threat of secession will be addressed below,93 that threat may be 
necessary in some degree to elicit respect from the federal government for a state’s rights. Steve 
                                                
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 421. 
90 Id.  
91 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
92 Id. 
93 See infra note 167 and accompanying text (explaining the benefit of there being some level of constant 
threat of secession as it relates to politics). 
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Eichler, the chief executive officer of TeaParty.org, was asked about the citizen secession 
petitions.94 He responded with a realistic understanding of the situation: “I’m glad people can 
vent their frustrations, but what if it’s more than that? What can we do to stop this encroachment 
into states’ rights? What are the tools? Well, there aren’t too many of them.”95 But, as State 
Representative Jaggi put it, “If it comes to push and shove, I hope we’re willing to stand up for 
our rights rather than just be pushed around.”96 
There is another argument that states can “stand up for [their] rights” while adhering to 
Constitutional boundaries, and it too is rooted in the Tenth Amendment.97 The thought process 
goes this way: To the extent that the Constitution does speak to the issue of powers, it resolves 
the issue in favor of the states or “the people”98 unless a power is expressly granted to the federal 
government or denied to the states elsewhere in the text.99 This part is, in effect, the Tenth 
Amendment reworded. And combining the fact that the Constitution gives no power to prevent 
or reverse secession to the federal government, with the fact that the power to secede is not 
specifically denied to the states or the American people, it follows that the Tenth Amendment 
guarantees retention of that power by the states and the nation’s citizens generally.100 
Examining the bicameral nature of the nation’s Congress also enhances the constitutional 
argument for secession. The two-house system implies that a state’s independent standing as a 
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political entity is vital.101 Rather than merely organizing representatives sent to Washington D.C. 
based on the population generally, the Constitution arranged for the Senate to equally represent 
each state—regardless of population.102 If the framers intended the states to be wholly and 
perpetually (in the “strong” sense)103 dissolved into the Union, the plethora of individual, equally 
weighted state voices would be unnecessary.104 In fact, the entire debate regarding the weight 
granted to each state’s congressional participation that nearly stalled the Constitutional 
Convention would never have taken place; states would have forfeited their identities into one 
mass.105 Clearly there is some benefit in recognizing the ability of a state to exist and operate 
separate and distinct from the forty-nine others.  
C. Moral Argument for Secession Amidst Oppression 
 Probably the most persuasive, overriding arguments for allowing secession in some 
manner arise from moral concerns. While adhering to form and procedure is ideal and creates 
order, circumstances change and can create the necessity of action. For example, the Articles of 
Confederation stated that any alteration or amendment to the provisions had to be “confirmed by 
the legislatures of every State.”106 The necessity for change was obvious, however. So Congress, 
still sitting under the Articles in 1788—after only eleven of the thirteen states had ratified the 
changes—put the Constitution in place.107 For nearly two years, until May of 1790 when Rhode 
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(Comm. Print 1993), available at http://democrats.rules.house.gov/archives/jcoc2.htm.  
102 Id. 
103 Neff, supra note 14, at 416.  
104 See JOINT COMM. ON THE ORG. OF CONGRESS, supra note 101 
105 See id. (describing the heated debate among state representatives at the convention surrounding whether 
small states or large states would gain more control in the newly created Congress and the compromise reached). 
106 THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1781) (emphasis added). 
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Island finally ratified the Constitution, the change was in place due to legitimacy and necessity 
trumping formalism.108 
 1. Secession As the Preservation of Liberty 
 One context in which the call for legitimacy to trump formalism may sound loudest is 
when a state’s grip on certain freedoms begins to slip. “The principal argument for recognition of 
a right to secede is that it would operate as a powerful deterrent to oppressive and discriminatory 
practices” and as an effective remedy for these injustices.109 James Madison recognized that the 
real crux of the secession discussion boiled down to this moral consideration.110 In 
acknowledging the strength of Daniel Webster’s argument opposing nullification and secession, 
Madison still lamented that Webster “dodge[d] the blow by confounding the claim to secede at 
will, with the right of seceding from intolerable oppression. The former answers itself, being a 
violation, without cause, of a faith solemnly pledged. The latter is another name only for 
revolution, about which there is no theoretic controversy.”111  
 Of course there was no controversy regarding the right of the people to revolt in 
Madison’s mind—he lived through the American Revolution that resulted, eventually, in his 
serving as the fourth President of the United States.112 But his view of a revolutionary right is 
well founded. Aside from the origins of the Union, which Madison struggled to define 
throughout his life,113 he understood the federal government organized under the Constitution as 
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ultimately subject to that right: “[T]he powers of the [federal] Government being exercised, as in 
other elective & responsible Governments, under the controul [sic] of its Constituents, the people 
& legislatures of the States, and subject to the Revolutionary Rights of the people in extreme 
cases.”114 
 Extreme cases ought to be just that of course—extreme. As was briefly mentioned above, 
the United States was born out of precisely such a circumstance.115 The founding fathers realized 
that securing the rights of “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” were essential to a 
legitimate government and  
[t]hat whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the 
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such 
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness. 
 
Therefore, any American would be hard-pressed to refute the right of people—whether as 
individuals or collectively as a political body—to secede and “institute new Government” should 
there ever be excessive oppression coming from the federal government. 
 2. Secession As the Prevention of War 
 Ultimately, formalities and political debates aside, history has proven that, when a group 
of individuals possesses total conviction in the truth of its duty to secede from a larger political 
entity, resistance to that desire brings about war.116 “If the state you want to leave does not want 
                                                                                                                                                       
[I]f formed by [the states] as imbodied into separate communities, as in the case of the 
Constitution of the U.S. a dissolution of the Constitutional Compact would replace them in the 
condition of separate communities, that being the Condition in which they entered into the 
compact; whereas if formed by the people as one community, acting as such by a numerical 
majority, a dissolution of the compact would reduce them to a state of nature, as so many 
individual persons. 
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 110. 
114 Id.  
115 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  
116 JAMES L. ERWIN, DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN AUTONOMOUS AND 
SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS xvi (2007) (noting that after the Civil War “[t]he federal government was stronger than 
ever, and had forcefully demonstrated its will to fight those who would secede”). 
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you to go, the results can be bloody.”117 And as the St. Louis University periodical reasoned quite 
simply: “[T]he previous secession of 1774 sparked a war with Britain as an effort to wrest 
control of the original 13 colonies…; and the secession of 1864 led to the Civil War. Therefore, 
if a third secession were to occur, it would certainly result in a second civil war.”118 This dim 
dynamic of political withdrawal is not exclusive to Northern America either.119 The loss of life 
and property accompanies secession resistance around the world.120 Furthermore, not only have 
the secession efforts of a group of states or colonies resulted in war, but the War for Texan 
Independence demonstrates that even the attempt at secession by a lone jurisdiction can warrant 
a violent confrontation in the eyes of the remaining majority.121 The presumed weakness of that 
sole, rebel body in capably waging war certainly plays a role in this response.122  
 While the federal government’s armed response to the Confederacy resulted in the 
preservation of the Union, it also resulted in the loss of more than 600,000 American lives.123 
Perhaps war could have been avoided and an alternative solution hammered out in time had 
Lincoln and his administration heeded the words of President John Quincy Adams noting the 
importance of a people’s will: 
The indissoluble link of union between the people of the several states of this confederated nation 
is, after all, not in the right but in the heart. If the day should ever come (may Heaven avert it!) 
when the affections of the people of these States shall be alienated from each other; when the 
fraternal spirit shall give way to cold indifference, or collision of interests shall fester into hatred, 
the bands of political associations will not long hold together parties no longer attracted by the 
                                                
117 Robert W. McGee, Secession Reconsidered, 1 J. OF LIBERTARIAN STUD. 11, 26 (1994). 
118 Andrew Sova, Constitutional Amendment an Alternative to Secession, U. NEWS (Nov. 29, 2012, 12:59 
PM), http://unewsonline.com/2012/11/29/constitutional-amendment-an-alternative-to-secession/. 
119 See McGee, supra note 117 (noting that “Thousands were killed during the partitioning of India and 
Pakistan, and the secession of Croatia and Slovenia from the former Yugoslavia [] also prov[ed] costly in loss of life 
and destruction of property”). 
120 Id. 
121 STEPHEN L. HARDIN, TEXIAN ILIAD – A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE TEXAS REVOLUTION 98 (1994). 
122 Id. T Mexican Secretary of War stated, “The superiority of the Mexican soldier over the mountaineers of 
Kentucky and the hunters of Missouri is well known. Veterans seasoned by 20 years of wars can't be intimidated by 
the presence of an army ignorant of the art of war, incapable of discipline, and renowned for insubordination." Id. 
123 See Lambert, supra note 5 and accompanying text (explaining the toll the Civil War took on the nation). 
 23 
magnetism of conciliated interests and kindly sympathies; and far better will it be for the people of 
the disunited states to part in friendship from each other, than to be held together by constraint.124 
 
But perhaps the circumstances of Lincoln’s time made war inevitable. Either way, the prevention 
of bloodshed is a—and perhaps the—most weighty consideration in favor of allowing for 
secession. 
III. THE MOST COMPELLING ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE NATIONAL RECOGNITION OF LEGITIMATE 
SECESSION 
 
 While maintaining the successful existence of any newly derived nation or nations would 
certainly be a difficult task, the brunt of that difficulty would fall to the people and government 
of such a jurisdiction once formed.125 So, though that issue is worth much discussion, what is 
exceedingly pressing to the United States as a whole right now are the ideological and logistical 
concerns that refute a state’s ability to reach the point of independence in the first place.126 
 The place to start, of course, is the Constitution and issues that the nation’s founding 
document presents to secessionists.127 But on top of constitutional arguments against secession 
are very real contentions rooted in both democracy and logic.128 
A. Constitutional Reasons to Contest the Idea of Secession 
 As Charles Cooke of the National Review notes, “We have at our disposal the most 
wonderful Constitution and nation that the world has ever seen. Let’s not hear any more foolish 
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talk of dismantling them.”129 That “most wonderful Constitution—which is silent as to the issue 
of secession directly—is utilized by both sides of the secession debate in forming arguments.130 
Whether from President Lincoln or from the Fourteenth Amendment passed immediately 
following his presidency, there exist constitutional interpretations to counter those discussed 
above.131 
 1. Lincoln’s Rebuttal to the Secessionist Tenth Amendment Argument 
 Abraham Lincoln’s primary argument that secession was unconstitutional was really 
quite simple. Though he acknowledged that the Constitution failed to expressly prohibit 
secession, he stated that trumping this acknowledgement was the understanding that the 
Constitution could not be interpreted to contain a provision for the destruction of the Union.132 
He argued that, whatever rights are reserved to the states by the Constitution, surely, [in those] 
are not included all conceivable powers, however mischievous or destructive.”133 And surely 
there is no state “power to lawfully destroy the Union itself,” he wrote.134 
 Furthermore, Lincoln was dumbfounded by the seemingly overriding notion of “states’ 
rights” via which the Confederacy claimed legitimacy under the Constitution.135 He pointed out 
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that “[t]he express plighting of faith by each and all of the original thirteen in the Articles of 
Confederation, two years later, that the Union shall be perpetual, is most conclusive” of the 
falsity of that secessionist idea.136 Lincoln continued basing his thought upon the puzzling nature 
of this quandary: “Having never been States, either in substance or in name, outside of the 
Union, whence this magical omnipotence [put forth by states] of ‘State rights” claiming the 
lawful ability to secede?137 
 2. Fourteenth Amendment Erases State Sovereignty 
  A second argument that finds footing in the nation’s Constitution played no role in the 
debate prior to the Civil War because it was conceived with the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1866.138 To many, the puzzling inquiry that arguably remained unanswered until 
this point was indubitably settled with this Congressional reinforcement of the Union victory.139 
The relevant portion of the amendment reads 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.140 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Constitution—no one of them ever having been a State out of the Union. The original ones passed 
into the Union even before they cast off their British colonial dependence; and the new ones each 
came into the Union directly from a condition of dependence, excepting Texas. And even Texas, 
in its temporary independence, was never designated a State. The new ones only took the 
designation of States on coming into the Union, while that name was first adopted for the old ones 
in and by the Declaration of Independence. 
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This language indicates that the Constitution and its guarantees form a compact—separate from 
any state action or document—directly between the American people and the federal 
government.141 It seems to further indicate that Americans owe their foremost allegiance to the 
United States, a nation rather than a confederation.142 What implication does this have then for 
state citizenship? The argument is that “correspondingly, states, as building blocks of the nation, 
have only second place in our allegiance with state citizenship being defined by the Fourteenth 
Amendment as only a geographic marker depending on where an American citizen happens to 
reside at any given time.”143 
 The impact of this understanding on the secession discussion is that “the United States 
involves a direct relationship between the federal government and citizens that is beyond any 
form of interference by the states.”144 Secession would have, by definition, interfered with that 
“direct relationship” and therefore would have deprived each citizen of a seceding state of the 
Constitution’s guarantees.145 
B. Logical, Democratic Opposition to Secession 
 In much the same way that those supporting secession are able to look outside the 
Constitution to morality or revolution for backing,146 those opposing secession can branch out 
from founding documents and claim logic and operative democracy as their allies.147 Ultimately, 
Cooke may have summed up the common-sense rhetoric for this side of the debate quite well in 
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writing those who agree “the United States is the greatest force for good in the history of the 
world should not be even contemplating its dissolution. Conservatives, remember, are worried 
about American decline, and there is no more sure way to hasten that than to break the country 
up into pieces.”148 In reality, a single element of secession creates both a logical and democratic 
concern. 
 1. Founding a Nation on Concept of Legal Secession Creates Fragility 
 This argument is short but sweet: If a state secedes, the precedent is set for that new 
nation.149 New arguments are sure to arise within that new nation resulting in a new majority and 
a new minority. The minority will secede and the cycle will start over: new disagreement, new 
majority, new minority.150 The bottom line of the argument is that a seceding state will not be 
able to stand on its own logic and acquiescence.151 As President Lincoln stated in his first 
inaugural address: “If a minority in such case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make a 
precedent which in turn will divide and ruin them; for a minority of their own secede from them 
whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such minority.”152 
 2. Allowing for Secession Can Snowball into Anarchy 
 The anarchy argument is, for all intents and purposes, a continuation of the fragility claim 
immediately above. Basically, the result of the secession cycle being repeated over and over 
within a seceded state is complete anarchy.153 The minority may always leave the majority until 
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there is no majority—each individual does what he sees fit adhering to no oversight.154 Lincoln, 
again in that same inaugural address, explained the inevitable result of secessionist behavior in 
the following manner: “Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as a permanent 
arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or 
despotism in some form is all that is left.”155 He understood this principle not as naming the 
majority infallible, but as representing a more acceptable way to order society than anarchy.156 A 
majority,” he explained, “held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always 
changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true 
sovereign of a free people.”157 
IV. RESPONSES TO OPPOSITION ARGUMENTS 
 While the arguments opposing the legitimacy of secession are not without merit, there are 
rather simple responses to these several claims which demonstrate that cautiously allowing for 
secession may be preferable to taking a hard-line stance against it.158 Both the Constitutional and 
philosophical issues secession presents have persuasive, proposed rebuttals.159 
A. Addressing Constitutional Concerns of Secession 
 As for the debate surrounding the Tenth Amendment’s implications for secession both 
sides of the debate have been threshed out above; but it is worth pointing out that “[i]n this 
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argument, Lincoln was on defense.”160 Secessionist thinking had, for many years prior to 
Lincoln’s presidency, held sway in arguing that the amendment reserved the right of secession to 
states.161 Conventional wisdom prior to the Civil War within the United States was that the 
Constitution, in fact, did not prohibit secession, and the Tenth Amendment only served to 
strengthen that understanding. Obviously the war and its results turned the popular trend heavily 
in the opposite direction.162 
 With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment and what that addition to the Constitution 
means for states’ rights, there is an argument that seems to defeat, or at least neutralize, 
secessionists’ opposition. Building upon the Tenth Amendment discussion in a way, the 
Fourteenth Amendment fails to address either a federal right to prohibit or a state’s right to carry 
out secession.163 That being the case, the claim that the 1866 amendment language prohibits 
secession by creating a primary, direct relationship between each U.S. citizen and the federal 
government seems tenuous at best; the Constitution still remains silent as to the issue, and that is 
the main secessionist focus.164 That primary, national citizenship can simply exist so long as a 
state does not exercise the right of secession presumably previously reserved to the state by the 
Tenth Amendment. Therefore, one cannot argue the Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional claim 
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without addressing the issue more broadly—specifically in a way that encompasses the Tenth 
Amendment as well. 
B. Responses to Philosophical Obstacles to Secession 
 Lincoln argued that the principle of secession sets a precedent by which a seceding state 
would eventually secede itself into oblivion.165 Secessionists agree—to a point. Instead of 
looking at separation as a minority destroying majority governance, however, the Confederacy, 
for example, merely created two majorities—one that remained in the North and one that took 
shape in the South.166 That is far from rapid repetition of division. Additionally they argue that 
yes, the precedent of secession within the new state would be set. But “if politicians know that a 
portion of their constituency can leave, they will be less likely to neglect their needs. More 
importantly, citizens will have a choice.”167 There is no disagreement in secession’s implications, 
only in its perception: Those opposed to secession view the option to withdraw as a negative, 
chaotic characteristic while those in support view it as a positive, liberating enhancement. 
 The secessionist response to the anarchy concern is similar in form: There is no 
disagreement as to the possibility that apparent anarchy could occur because “[t]heoretically… 
the smallest unit that can secede is an individual.”168 However, the variance from Lincoln comes 
in the secessionist outlook on this possible occurrence: An individual of course may secede; 
because to bar that as an option results in injustice to anyone forced to be part of a political 
affiliation he does not wish to be a part of.169 Of course rather than secede an individual may 
simply move to another jurisdiction and avoid having to take that political action; but moving is 
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not easy. Uprooting oneself—and likely all of one’s family and belongings—can be both 
complicated and costly. Therefore, theoretically, for an individual with limited resources and a 
lack of opportunity elsewhere, secession could be the more plausible answer.  
V. WHY AND HOW SECESSION OUGHT TO BE ACCEPTED AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO ARMED 
CONFLICT 
 
 The arguments for and against secession are endless and often circular depending on 
one’s interpretation of Constitutional history and language. Its legal legitimacy, while existent, is 
far from crystal clear. At the end of the day, however, there is one factor at work in any severe 
division within a nation that calls for the United States to carefully consider and craft a procedure 
by which a state or collection of states may secede from Union.170 Despite relevant concerns 
regarding the practicality and feasibility of a state’s survival outside of the Union, much of that 
debate is conjecture, and, ultimately, the state itself must deal with those issues more so than the 
U.S.171 The procedure permitting secession must balance the interests of the seceding state with 
those of the remaining Union and allow for the peaceful coexistence of the two entities.172 
A. Tipping the Scale: Secession Is Preferable to War 
 The Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments can be argued round-and-round within the 
secession discussion until both sides are blue in the face. Still, when it comes right down to it, 
neither amendment—nor any other portion of the Constitution—directly maps out a power or 
prohibition of secession.173 Even the Declaration of Independence, while impliedly referencing a 
natural right of secession, does not expressly settle the debate because it was drafted before the 
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Union among the states was formed.174 Those questioning the legality of secession can certainly 
point to these apparent gaps as reason to doubt the wisdom of allowing secession. 
 Therefore, the facts on the ground dictate the nation’s attitude toward this topic moving 
forward. The facts are simple: There is great frustration among many states and countless 
American citizens with the actions of the federal government.175 History demonstrates and the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that war is “inevitable” when, as with the times leading up to 
the Civil War, a sizeable group of individuals is involuntarily forced to submit to a government it 
views as unjust.176 The country has not come to the edge of a second civil war… yet. But rather 
than turn a blind eye to that possibility, any and all alternatives ought to be plausibly presented 
so as to avoid a conflict of the sort that took the lives of 2% of the U.S. population roughly 150 
years ago.177 
B. Okay, Secession May Be a Viable Alternative Under Rare Circumstances, But… 
 If it is accepted that secession is permissible when entered into out of necessity and 
through a carefully crafted procedure, that consent is only half the battle. An entirely new crop of 
issues would arise: Which states may secede? If the nation overall signs on to the Constitutional 
compact idea discussed above,178 does that mean only the original parties to that “contract” can 
rescind the agreement? Additionally, the existence and long-term survival of any newly 
independent state or group of states would be a delicate proposition itself. 
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 1. All for One and One for All? 
 Only thirteen of the now fifty United States existed as sovereign prior to the formation of 
the compact among the states and between the states and the federal government.179 Therefore, 
if, in fact, there is a breach of that agreement by the federal government so substantial as to 
warrant rescission, a legitimate question is posed asking whether only those thirteen states are 
able to entertain such rescission. Tangential to this complication another idea: Even if one is 
willing to admit the constitutionality of secession was questionable until the time of the Civil 
War so that states that joined the Union prior to the conflict can claim lack of mutual 
understanding upon execution of the contract, surely “the War Between the States resolved the 
Constitution’s meaning for any states that entered the Union after 1865, with no delusions about 
the contractual understanding of the parties,” right?180 
 Wrong. First of all, in addressing the Civil War status of Texas, a state added to the 
Union after the ratification of the Constitution, the Supreme Court made clear that “the union 
between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the 
union between the original states.”181 At first read this may sound like a case against secession 
not by added states but by any state. However, the way the Court continued negates this 
understanding: “There was no place for reconsideration or revocation, except through revolution 
or through consent of the States.”182 The Court actually expressly acknowledged a state’s—any 
state’s—right to revoke its participation in the Union “through consent of the States.”183 That 
idea of secession with consent will be utilized below in establishing a legitimate secession 
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procedure.184 But that acknowledgment is not all that this language accomplishes. It further 
implies complete equality among the states, equating Texas’ relationship with the states with the 
relationships among the original states. Equality mandates a lack of disparities. Therefore, just as 
Texas may secede with permission, so may any state.185 
 Additionally, reservation of the right to repossess governmental duties from the federal 
government was an integral part of multiple states’ constitutional ratification motions.186 The 
language used in these ratifications indicates an understanding that this right belongs to any state 
that was or would become a part of the Union.187 For example, Virginia’s motion stated,  
WE the Delegates of the people of Virginia…DO in the name and in behalf of the people of 
Virginia, declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived 
from the people of the United States may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be 
perverted to their injury or oppression.188 
 
First, these ratifications, in addition to serving as votes, were expressions of a state’s 
understanding of what the nation would look like moving forward after accepting the 
Constitution. Therefore, Virginia’s grasp of implications was Virginia’s grasp of implications as 
they related not only to that state but to all states (and “people”)189 under the Constitution. And 
this ratification was accepted by all states in existence at the time—indicating a unanimous 
agreement to those implications.190 Second, as pointed out above, individual “people” did not 
ratify the Constitution; instead sovereign states did so. Consequently, the “people of the United 
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States,” referred to by Virginia as having the ability to “resume” control, are implicitly not 
restricted to citizens in their individual capacities.191 The reference logically includes gatherings 
of the people, such as the sovereign states that consented to the “deriv[ation]” of powers from the 
people in the first place, as well.192 
2. They Think They Can? They Think They Can. 
Probably the easiest counter to secession to make is that a state could not survive on its 
own even if managed to secede. For example, after listing a military, a healthcare system, 
disaster relief, welfare, a FBI, and other governmental agencies or programs that would 
presumably be needed in a newly independent state, one columnist wanted people to “remember 
how impossible it would be to successfully secede from the U.S.”193 Certainly starting off on its 
own after being so critically attached to a union of fifty states would be a challenging endeavor 
for any sect of the country that would secede. But would it, in fact, be impossible?  
The first response to this concern, whether looking at Texas or any state for that matter, 
attacks the premise that many, including the columnist mentioned above, employ in viewing 
secession as not feasible. The premise, built upon the understanding that a government must be 
of proper size in order to provide the services that a government ought to supply, is that 
governments should provide an array of services, such as education and welfare programs, which 
would be above and beyond the bare necessities of an effective administration.194 Those 
challenging secession’s practicality habitually factor in the costs of these additional services in 
calculating “impossible” start-up costs for a newly independent state.195 And it is true: “A 
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government that provides comprehensive services such as these must be fairly large” and amply 
funded.196 However, the government could be much smaller if those wishing to secede do not 
desire to carry the weight of an expansive administrative state.197 If they are satisfied with a 
“minimal state that protects only life, liberty, and property, the unit could be very small 
indeed.”198 
Still, no matter the requisite size of the government, very real practical concerns would 
need to be answered. Because Texas has been the focus of much of the recent secession 
discussion in the news,199 had more than 125,000 signatures on its 2012 secession petition,200 and 
has experience standing alone as a sovereign nation—not to mention its geographic enormity—
the Lonestar State is a logical place to begin a practical analysis of any single or collective 
secession effort within the United States. Furthermore, based on the aforementioned factors, any 
secession from the U.S. in coming years would likely begin with or at least include Texas. 
Additional reasons that any seceding entity would be wise to include Texas double as 
reasons why any such secession could be successful and rebut the claim that secession would 
inevitably fail.201 First of all, as for defense, Texas has quite a force at its disposal: the Texas 
State Guard, which reports solely to the governor; the Texas National Guard and Air Guard; and 
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the “legendary Texas Rangers”—not to mention a very amply armed citizenry.202 Regarding 
resources and utilities, Texas is the only state with its own power grid, which is controlled 
entirely by the state and covers the vast majority of the state.203 It also is home to one quarter of 
the nation’s oil and one-third of the country’s natural gas.204 Finally, economic concerns are at 
least alleviated by the fact that Texas, if it were an independent nation right now, would have the 
thirteenth highest GDP in the world.205 Not only that, but more jobs have been created in Texas 
in the last decade than in the other forty-nine states combined.206 There is a reason it seems that 
everybody knows somebody moving to Texas. 
A final, far less academic, albeit historical, reason to believe in successful secession is 
history itself.207 The American colonies seceded from the British empire of the day and, more 
than 230 years later, are doing just fine “on their own.” This thriving nation was conceived from 
a “secession” of sorts, and its founding circumstances were certainly as dire—if not far more 
dire—than what would confront a seceding state, such as Texas, today:208 At the least, hundreds 
of years of witnessing and partaking in a successful democracy alone would seem to give today’s 
states an edge. Yes, the room for geographic expansion is far more limited for a state today than 
it would have been for an eighteenth-century colony, but, in a way, that fact would only alleviate 
a state’s burden by taking a plethora of expansion issues off of the table and would allow the 
administration to focus attention within the jurisdiction’s borders. 
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C. Developing a Legitimate Secession Procedure 
 Clearly there is no “correct way” to institute a route to secession, and there is no 
“uniform method” that is accepted globally as the norm.209 Still, by scanning the surface of the 
secession landscape around the world, one can collect helpful insight to assist in the development 
of a procedure within the United States. Within the U.S. itself are also instructive processes that 
can be analyzed and altered to craft a legitimate secession procedure.210 A vital aspect of the 
final product is that it ought to require majorities at both the state and national level before 
permitting the secession of state from the Union.211 
1. International Examples of Secession Processes 
There are three concrete aspects of permitted secession that stand out internationally. The 
first is the fact that provisions expressly addressing secession within a nation’s constitution are 
rare.212 One comprehensive survey of these provisions merely highlighted a handful of countries, 
such as St. Kitts and Nevis, as exemplifying jurisdictions that prefer to use this route.213 Couple 
this with the difficulty of altering the U.S. Constitution, and a constitutional secession provision 
seems like both a challenging and unpopular proposition. 
The second international characteristic to keep in mind is that, “from the various 
constitutional provisions for secession in existence, almost none of them allow for unilateral 
secession.”214 This is common sense. Any place that installs a legal, unilateral right of secession 
is asking for chaos and conflict because of the constant, looming threat of secession any one 
political body could hold over the majority. Additionally, such a provision would fail to satisfy 
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even the “weak” perpetuity described above because a state could then theoretically leave the 
Union whether a substantial breach of compact existed or not.215 Not only that, but allowing an 
action to be conducted unilaterally that would affect the Union in as dramatic a way as secession 
would run contrary to the “majoritarian and popular sovereignty principles” so intricately 
intertwined throughout this nation’s constitutional structure.216  
Finally, looking at places outside of the U.S. that have “constitutionalized” secession in 
one form or the other, the processes entail “not just a referendum vote, but also a negotiated 
settlement.”217 Taking into consideration the countless legal, economic, and governmental 
complexities that would arise with a state’s secession from the Union, allowing for flexibility 
both in the final terms and the permitted timeframe of any such secession would be a necessity. 
2. Influence of Domestic Processes in the Development of a Legitimate Procedure 
There are two processes within the structure of the United States that should be 
considered in the drafting of a secession procedure: the way in which states entered the Union—
other than the original thirteen—and the Constitutional amendment processes. As for the first, it 
only makes sense to look at how a state got into the Union if one is proposing a way for that state 
to get out. To the extent that the Constitution dictated that initial process, the pertinent language 
reads “New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union”218 and, additionally, 
“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting 
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”219 This vast flexibility granted to 
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Congress historically translated into a state being admitted, after applying to Congress for 
statehood, with a simple majority vote of both houses and the President’s signature.220 
Regarding an amendment to the nation’s Constitution, it would seem that secession, in a 
way, would be just that: In much the same way that an amendment would alter the substance and 
operation of the Union, secession, by any number of states, would do the same. Therefore, the 
processes of the two alterations should at least resemble one another. An amendment can pass 
via two routes, both of which require ratification by three-fourths of the states—either the states’ 
legislatures or their conventions depending on what Congress proscribes: Two-thirds of both 
houses of Congress can propose an amendment as can a convention called by two-thirds of state 
legislatures.221 Again, the majoritarian principles tied to national change are evident in both of 
these domestic processes and ought not to be disregarded.222 
3. A Legitimate Procedure Allowing for Secession 
Taking into account the lessons learned from secession provisions abroad and the 
procedures instituted within the U.S. allowing for significant modifications to the Union,223 a 
procedure ought to be installed via a congressional act to allow for secession should 
circumstances, such as impending armed conflict, warrant permitting a state to leave the Union. 
The first step of this new procedure must come at the state level. A simple majority vote in a 
state’s legislature to bring the issue of secession to the people will suffice. But since there must 
be a strong majority sentiment within the state favoring secession to ensure solidarity and 
dedication to the success of the potential independence, the popular vote must result in at least 
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two-thirds of voters in support of seceding from the Union. Ideally a state would not reach the 
point of secession without incredibly valid complaints with the status of its place in the Union 
allegedly justifying “rescission” of its constitutional compact with the federal government; 
therefore, as with the original Declaration of Independence, any state(s) must, within the 
secession proposal, “declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”224 
At that point the proposal will be sent to Congress for both houses to review. Just as 
Congress had the final say, minus the President’s approval, in bringing a state into the Union,225 
Congress will handle this decision as well. However, in contrast to the acceptance of a state into 
the Union and the amendment process,226 a simple majority will be required in one house and 
two-thirds in favor will be required in the other house. This would, while still posing quite a 
hurdle for any secession effort, allow for a bit of flexibility in the process: Hypothetically, if a 
large number of states supported a certain secession proposal but those states did not have large 
populations, two-thirds could be reached in the Senate, and the requisite of a mere simple 
majority in the House would allow the proposal to pass. The President need not sign a passing 
proposal and may not veto it since, as both history and current events demonstrate, the actions of 
any given president can be the very polarizing cause of a desire to secede in the first place. 
The last piece of the procedural puzzle would be, by far, the most complex and would 
require certainly more than one article worth of explanation to thresh out thoroughly. It is the 
untangling of the many ties between both the seceding state the U.S. and the state’s citizens and 
nation as a whole. Because of its relative ease, the latter will be addressed first: After any 
secession proposal is passed, there ought to be a twenty-four month transition period during 
                                                
224 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776); see supra notes 86-90 and accompanying 
text (explaining circumstances and authority allowing, or even compelling, a party to rescind a compact). 
225 U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3. 
226 See supra Subsection V.C.2 (explaining the way in which states have traditionally been admitted to the 
Union and the ways that amendments may be added to the Constitution). 
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which time citizens of the seceding state may freely decide citizenship between the two nations 
and make appropriate arrangements to reside in one or the other. As for the state’s ties to the 
United States, the transition period would allow for certain financial, military, and economic 
connections between the two entities to either deteriorate slowly and deliberately as necessary or, 
in the case of any prospectively negotiated alliances or treaties, solidify gradually. At the end of 
the twenty-four months, the new nation would be entirely on its own, standing on the strength of 
however many members it possesses. 
CONCLUSION 
 The United States is not very “united” as of 2013.227 Could that change? Sure—toward 
unity or division. If the divide deepens and a state or group of states stand on the brink of 
withdrawal from the Union, compromises and various bipartisan efforts ought to be utilized to 
avoid secession, of course.228 However, as evidenced by the Civil War and other secession 
attempts around the globe, such efforts do not have a perfect success rate.229 In realizing the 
legitimacy of secession grounded both in our nation’s construction and principles of morality,230 
allowing states to secede is preferable to armed conflict—especially one that would take place 
wholly on U.S. soil.231  
Despite issues and concerns worthy of consideration and discussion in challenging 
                                                
227 See supra Section I (listing and explaining the various ways in which schisms both between the state and 
federal governments and among states are widening via both legislation and popular politics). 
228 See supra Section V.A (highlighting the fact that secession ought only to be viewed as a last resort in 
order to avoid armed conflict). 
229See supra Subsection II.C.2 (citing instances, both within the U.S. and internationally, in which societal 
unrest with a bar on secession led to costly wars). 
230 See supra Section II (explaining the most compelling historical and moral arguments in support of 
permitting secession in some fashion). 
231 See supra Section V.A (reinforcing the opinion that secession ought, at the least, to be viewed as a last 
resort in order to avoid armed conflict). 
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secession’s legitimacy,232 if revolution is inevitable a procedure must be in place to allow 
alternatively for peaceable withdrawal. Blending traditional American and international 
influences regarding significant national alterations results in a legitimate process that requires 
strong support at both the state and federal levels while making the possibility of secession a 
reality.233 That reality would not come without practical complications that must be given time to 
untangle and deteriorate.234 Given the strength and resolve of the United States and its people 
throughout history, secession seems unlikely. However, should the circumstances present 
themselves, the nation must be prepared. 
                                                
232 See supra Section III (raising opposing arguments to the idea of permitting secession based both on 
logistical and democratic concerns). 
233 See supra Section V.C (creating a legitimate procedure for secession from the Union utilizing both 
American processes in place and international provisions regarding secession elsewhere in the world). 
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